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America’s urban neighborhoods generally
fared better in the 1990s than they had over
the preceding decade, but patterns of
improvement and decline were complex
and in many ways defied conventional wis-
dom. Traditional categorizations (e.g., high-
poverty versus low-poverty, weak markets
versus strong markets) are much too sim-
ple to provide sound guides for policy.
Local officials everywhere need to learn
how to vary their strategies in response to
different neighborhood circumstances and
trajectories likely to exist in their cities. 
In this analysis, we divide census tracts
in the 100 largest metropolitan areas into
three groups based on how their poverty
rates changed over a decade: improved
(poverty rate decreased by 5 percentage
points or more), worsened (rate increased by
5 points or more), and remained stable (rate
changed by less than 5 points in either
direction). 
 In the 1990s, a larger share of all tracts
worsened (15 percent) than improved
(11 percent), but this represented a much
more positive result than that of the
1980s, when 19 percent worsened and
only 8 percent improved.
 Patterns of change in neighborhoods
where poverty is concentrated (mostly in
the central cities) have been much more
volatile than in those that are less poor.
In the 1990s, only 45 percent of high-
poverty tracts (poverty rates of 30 per-
cent or more in 1990) were stable,
compared with almost 90 percent of low-
poverty tracts (poverty rates of less than
10 percent). And among those that
changed significantly, the mix was more
favorable for high-poverty tracts (37 per-
cent improved, 18 percent worsened)
than low-poverty tracts (1 percent
improved, 11 percent worsened).
 While stronger market conditions gener-
ally implied a more favorable balance,
almost all metropolitan areas saw a mix
of trends among their neighborhoods in
the 1990s. In the strongest markets (top
third of metropolitan areas ranked by an
index we constructed), a larger share of
all tracts improved (15 percent) than
worsened (9 percent). In the weaker
markets (bottom third by our index),
many more worsened (19 percent), but
even there, a nontrivial share improved
(6 percent). 
 Just over half of all tracts that worsened
experienced a significant change in
racial composition (where racial and eth-
nic groups that increased in share did so
by 15 percentage points or more over the
decade). While this was not true every-
where, it appears that a notable worsen-
ing of neighborhood poverty in the
1990s was often accompanied by the in-
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migration of lower-income minorities.
Hispanics accounted for the largest
increases in 56 percent of these tracts,
and blacks did so in 31 percent.
 Turning to tracts that improved, how-
ever, comparatively few of them (22 per-
cent), experienced a similarly large
changes in racial composition. Whites
and other non-Hispanic nonblack
groups accounted for the largest
increases in only a third of these (only
300 tracts in all). While this measure is
fairly crude, it certainly suggests that
where large decreases in poverty took
place, gentrification involving notable
racial change was generally not the
dominant explanation.
 While tracts that experienced significant
changes in poverty in the 1990s were
found in all parts of the metropolitan
area, tracts that improved were predom-
inantly located in the inner portions of
the central city and the outer rings of the
suburbs. In contrast, tracts that wors-
ened were more prevalent in the outer
portions of the cities and, in particular,
the inner ring of the suburbs.
 Beyond this, our analysis found no sim-
ple set of indicators as of 1990 that reli-
ably differentiated tracts that would
improve, remain stable, or worsen over
the subsequent decade (regression
analysis explained 30 percent of the vari-
ation at best). However, given the
importance of these changes, local data
systems that could provide more reliable
early warnings are worth pursuing. 
Purpose and Approach
Recent research has shown that after
decades of decline, America’s cities saw
some notable improvements in the 1990s.
In particular, the longstanding trend
toward concentrated poverty was reversed
overall. The share of the poor living in
high-poverty neighborhoods (poverty rates
of 30 percent or more), which had
increased from 25 to 31 percent in the
1980s, dropped all the way back to 26 per-
cent in 2000. The absolute number of poor
people in high-poverty neighborhoods
grew from 4.9 million in 1980 to 7.1 million
in 1990 but decreased to 6.7 million in 2000
(Kingsley and Pettit 2003; see also Jar-
gowsky 2003). 
Research to date, however, has not told
the whole story. It has emphasized the
good news and has not said much about
the mix of good and bad in different places.
It has not tried to look into the relation-
ships between varying changes in poverty
levels and the characteristics and forces
that might explain them. 
The purpose of this brief is to begin to
shed more light on the way the changes in
the 1990s took place in the hope of better
preparing local leaders to anticipate market
forces and, thus, guide neighborhood
change more effectively. Specifically, we
ask three questions. The first can be
answered directly with our data: (1) How
did the overall balance between neighbor-
hood improvement and worsening in the
1990s compare with the balance in the
1980s, and how did it vary for different
types of neighborhoods in different loca-
tions? The other two questions are equally
if not more important for policy, but they
are much more difficult to answer defini-
tively: (2) To what extent were changes in
neighborhood poverty rates (up or down)
explained by mobility (people of different
income levels moving in and out) rather
than changes in the incomes of the original
residents? and (3) What characteristics of
neighborhoods are good predictors that
their poverty rates will either improve or
worsen?
For the first question, analysis of the
same topic for the 1980s (but only pub-
lished recently) yielded findings of great
importance for local policy. Galster and col-
leagues (2003) find considerable complexity
in patterns of neighborhood change. While
many urban neighborhoods saw notable
increases in poverty rates, consistent with
the overall expansion of concentrated
poverty in that decade, a significant num-
ber of other, older neighborhoods saw their
poverty rates decline. This evidence contra-
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dicts the urban “life cycle theory,” which
held that neighborhoods inevitably deterio-
rate as they get older and did not hold out
much promise for revitalization as the
aging process was under way (see Birch
1971; Schwirian 1983). One purpose of our
work is to see whether basic findings of
Galster and colleagues for the 1980s are
corroborated by the changes that occurred
in the 1990s.
This research is based on data for census
tracts derived from the Neighborhood
Change Database (NCDB), the only major
source of tract-level decennial census data in
which tract boundaries are defined consis-
tently over time (we use the terms tracts and
neighborhoods interchangeably throughout
this brief). Metropolitan area and city boun-
daries are also held constant, with data for
all geographic units for each year presented
for boundaries as defined for the 2000 Cen-
sus.1 Some of our analysis pertains to all U.S.
metropolitan areas as defined at the time of
the 2000 Census, but the brief focuses on
conditions in the 100 largest metropolitan
areas.2
A Shifting Balance of Improve-
ment and Deterioration 
Table 1 shows the transitions that occurred
between poverty categories for the 50,502
tracts that made up all 330 metropolitan
areas in both the 1980s and 1990s. The top
row, for example, shows that of all the tracts
that had poverty rates below 10 percent in
1980, the vast majority (84 percent) were in
that same category a decade later; only 15
percent had shifted to categories with
poverty rates above 10 percent. The compa-
rable vector for the below–10 percent cate-
gory in the 1990s looks very similar.
Changes were more frequent, however,
where poverty rates were higher. Among
tracts that started the 1980s in the highest
category (a poverty rate of 30 percent or
more), 83 percent wound up in the same
category at the end of that decade. But in
the 1990s, fewer (73 percent) stayed in the
same group, and notably more saw reduc-
tions in poverty rates. In the 20–30 per-
cent poverty range, far fewer tracts saw
increases in poverty (and more saw reduc-
tions) in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
It is easy to see how these transitions
yielded a net increase in concentrated
poverty in the 1980s and a net reduction
over the 1990s, but it is important to keep
the complexity in mind. Even in the 1980s,
when conditions were worsening overall,
tracts saw reductions in poverty; and in
the 1990s, when conditions were generally
improving, a significant number still expe-
rienced a worsening of conditions in that
Percent of Tracts by Poverty Rate, End of Decade
Poverty rate at start of decade < 10% 10–20% 20–30% 30%+
1980–90 Transitions
< 10% 84 14 1 0
10–20% 24 52 19 5
20–30% 3 20 40 38
30%+ 2 3 13 83
1990–2000 Transitions
< 10% 86 13 1 0
10–20% 24 58 16 2
20–30% 2 29 48 20
30%+ 1 4 22 73
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
TABLE 1. Poverty Category Transitions by Poverty Rate, 1980–90 and 1990–2000 
(percent of tracts)
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regard. The difference in the net
result between the decades appears
only because of a shift in proportions
rather than any fundamental change
in the process by which neighbor-
hoods change. 
A better way to look at the
changes is to establish categories
where the magnitude of the change is
measured directly.3 In the rest of this
brief, we divide census tracts into
three groups—improved, worsened,
and remained stable—and we focus in
on the 38,034 tracts that make up the
100 largest metropolitan areas.
The terms “improved” and
“worsened” are justified here, since
changes in poverty rates are corre-
lated with many other measures of
change in neighborhood well-being.
For example, over the 1990s, the share
of adults lacking high school degrees
dropped by 8 percent on average in
the improving tracts as we have
defined them, but it showed no
change in the worsening tracts. The
share of families with children that
were headed by single females
dropped by 2 percent in the improv-
ing tracts but increased by 6 percent
in the worsening tracts. Estimated
average home values increased by 25
percent in the improving tracts but
dropped by 9 percent in the worsen-
ing tracts. 
Overall results with respect to pat-
terns of change using these measures
are shown in figure 1. A larger share of
all tracts actually worsened in the
1990s (15 percent) than improved (11
percent), but this represented a much
more positive result than that of the
1980s, when 19 percent worsened and
only 8 percent improved. The change
was driven dominantly by what hap-
pened in the central cities of these
metropolitan areas. There, the share of
all tracts that improved grew
markedly (from 11 percent in the 1980s
to 18 percent in the 1990s), and the
share that worsened dropped by a
substantial amount (from 30 to 22 per-
cent). In the suburbs, there was much
less change: a significantly larger share
of all tracts was in the stable category
in both decades, and the proportions
in the improving and worsening cate-
gories were comparatively small. Still,
the total number of tracts in the 
suburbs is larger so the problems there
should not be seen as trivial. In the
1990s, 2,455 suburban tracts worsened,
compared with 3,112 in the central
cities.
The contrasts are even more strik-
ing when we compare the changes for
neighborhoods grouped by initial
poverty rates (figure 2). Those with
low poverty rates (less than 10 per-
cent) at the start of each decade
showed very little change. The domi-
nant majority among them (87–
88 percent) remained stable by our
definition in both decades. Among
the remainder, the share that im-
proved stayed about the same (1 to 
2 percent) as did the share that wors-
ened (11 percent). 
However, as the chart shows,
three things change notably and with
surprising regularity as poverty rates
go up. First, the share of tracts in the
“stable” category goes down (both
decades). Second, the share that
improved gets larger. Third, the ratio
of the share that improved in 1990s to
the comparable share in the 1980s
also goes up. To illustrate the range,
we compare the data for low-poverty
tracts (poverty rates below 10 percent
at the start of the decade) and high-
poverty tracts (poverty rates of 30
percent or more).
 The share in the stable category in
the 1990s dropped from 88 percent
30
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FIGURE 1. Percent of Census Tracts by Change in Poverty Rate, 100 Largest Metropolitan
Areas, 1980s and 1990s
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
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for low-poverty tracts to 45 percent
for high-poverty tracts; the compa-
rable change in the 1980s was a
drop from 87 to 34 percent.
 In the 1990s, only 1 percent of
low-poverty tracts improved, 
less than 10 percent of the share
that worsened, but 37 percent 
of the high-poverty tracts
improved, two times the share
that worsened.
 In low-poverty tracts, the share
that improved was miniscule in
both decades, but in high-
poverty tracts, the 37 percent that
improved in the 1990s was 1.5
times the share that improved in
the preceding decade.
We noted earlier that Galster and
colleagues (2003), using the same
category definitions, find that,
against a background of generally
increasing poverty concentration 
in the 1980s, the number of poor
urban neighborhoods that improved
was still significant. This research
notably contradicted past theory 
that continued decline was almost
always to be expected in such 
places. The evidence presented 
here certainly reinforces that conclu-
sion. Also, those authors thought the
significant volatility in poverty rate
trajectories they found among high-
poverty tracts in the 1980s was note-
worthy. The fact that we found 
similar volatility in the 1990s (albeit
with a different balance in out-
comes) suggests that volatility 
itself is a condition to be expected 
in inner cities. This conclusion
makes the task of planning for
volatility more hopeful (continued
decline is not preordained) but also
more challenging.
Variations by Region and
Housing Market Strength 
How, and to what extent, do these
outcomes vary across the nation’s
large metropolitan areas? To answer
that question, we divided the 100
metropolitan areas by region and by
the strength of their housing markets
in the 1990s (table 2). To construct the
index, we first calculated the percent
change in average gross rent and in
the average value of owner-occupied
homes.4 We then converted the rental
and owner indicator values into 
Z-scores for each metropolitan area
and then averaged the two scores to
create the index.5 Finally, we ranked
metropolitan areas by their combined
index value. We then labeled the top
third of metros by this average (those
with the largest increases) as “strong
markets,” the lowest third as “weak
markets,” and those in between as
“intermediate markets.”
Across all types of metropolitan
areas in all regions, roughly three-
quarters of all tracts were in the sta-
ble category in the 1990s, but there
were notable variations in improve-
ment and decline by market type. In
the strong markets, a much larger
share of all tracts improved than
worsened (15 versus 9 percent). In the
weak markets, the pattern was
reversed (6 percent improved and 19
percent worsened); in the intermedi-
ate markets, the shares that worsened
and improved were about the same
(14 and 15 percent).
These basic relationships were
similar in all regions, so the regional
shares of improving versus worsen-
ing neighborhoods varied depending
on where their metropolitan markets
fell on the spectrum from strong to
weak. The weak markets were
located dominantly in the Northeast
1980s
Poverty rate
0–10%
Poverty rate
10–20%
Poverty rate
20–30%
Poverty rate
30%+
1990s1980s1990s1980s 1990s1980s1990s
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FIGURE 2. Percent of Census Tracts by Change in Poverty Rate by Poverty Rate Category, 
100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1980s and 1990s
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
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(most of the mid-sized urban centers
of New England) and the West 
(metropolitan areas in southern and
central California with sluggish
economies in the 1990s). In these two
groups of weak markets, worsening
tracts notably outnumbered improv-
ing ones. The same two groups
account for all the metropolitan areas
identified in our earlier research as
having experienced an increase in
concentrated poverty in the 1990s—
the exceptions to the dominant
national trend (Kingsley and Pettit
2003). 
As to strong markets, there were
9 of them in the West, along with 9 in
the Midwest and 15 in the South. The
South experienced roughly equal
shares of improving and worsening
tracts, and the Midwest had the most
favorable ratio of improving tracts to
worsening ones overall. 
Among high-poverty tracts,
improving tracts outnumbered wors-
ening ones even in weak-market met-
ropolitan areas, although the ratios
became more favorable as market
strength increased. For the weak-
market metropolitan areas overall, 
30 percent improved and 24 percent
worsened. In the strong markets, the
relationship was remarkably positive:
63 percent improved and only 7 per-
cent worsened. 
Mobility versus Changes 
in the Circumstances of 
Residents 
Our second objective was to learn
more about the extent to which
changes in neighborhood poverty
rates in the 1990s were due to mobil-
ity (households at different income
levels moving in and out) rather than
changes in the incomes of the existing
residents. The question is critical to
the way the findings are interpreted.
If the “improvements” observed were
mainly the result of mobility (gentrifi-
cation displacing lower-income popu-
lations) the results would be regarded
as problematic rather than beneficial.
Unfortunately, the census does
not have data for tracts on in- and
out-movers by income level, so we
cannot answer the question directly.
However, certain indicators can shed
some light on the issue. One is calcu-
lated from census data on the total
number of residents (over 5 years
old) at the time of the census that
had lived in a different house or
apartment five years earlier (keep 
in mind that this measure includes
moves within the same tract or 
from neighboring tracts as well as
those from more distant locations).
TOTAL 1990 POVERTY RATE 30% OR MORE
Percent of Tracts Percent of Tracts
Number Improving Stable Worsening Improving Stable Worsening
of metro- (pov.chg. (pov.chg. (pov.chg. (pov.chg. (pov.chg. (pov.chg.
politan Number 5% +5% +5% Number 5% +5% +5% 
areas of tracts or more) to 5%) or more) of tracts or more) to 5%) or more)
Northeast 20 8,483 8 74 18 899 40 43 17
Intermediate market 4 3,441 12 64 24 516 42 41 17
Weak market 16 5,042 5 80 15 383 37 46 17
Midwest 20 8,726 15 77 8 1,222 65 27 8
Strong market 9 3,814 17 76 7 548 69 25 5
Intermediate market 11 4,912 14 77 10 674 61 29 10
South 37 11,255 13 73 13 1,272 53 37 10
Strong market 15 3,331 16 73 11 395 52 39 9
Intermediate market 15 5,134 16 71 13 655 58 35 7
Weak market 7 2,790 7 78 16 222 39 41 21
West 23 9,570 8 73 18 671 35 41 23
Strong market 9 3,487 13 79 8 190 66 27 6
Intermediate market 3 1,001 8 76 17 53 45 36 19
Weak market 11 5,082 5 69 26 428 20 48 31
Top 100 Metropolitan Areas 100 38,034 11 74 15 4,064 51 36 13
Strong market 33 10,632 15 76 9 1,133 63 30 7
Intermediate market 33 14,488 14 72 15 1,898 54 34 11
Weak market 34 12,914 6 75 19 1,033 30 46 24
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
TABLE 2. Change in Poverty by Metropolitan Market Strength
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The overwhelming conclusion to
be drawn from examining these data
is that there was a substantial amount
of movement almost everywhere in
the 1990s. In the median tract in the
large metropolitan areas, 45 percent
(almost half) of the residents had
moved over the past five years. Only
a quarter of all tracts had move rates
below 37 percent, and the highest
quarter of the tracts had rates exceed-
ing 54 percent.
There were variations in these
rates for different types of neigh-
borhoods, but the variations were
not dramatic. For example, mobil-
ity increases with poverty rates, 
but the range is narrow: from a
median of 43 percent for low-poverty
tracts to 49 percent for high-poverty
tracts.
Analysis of this indicator is a
useful backdrop to our understand-
ing, but it does not get at exactly
what we are looking for. A poor
neighborhood that improved in the
1990s by our definition (poverty rate
dropped by 5 points or more) and
had a high share of households that
had moved over the past five years
was not necessarily gentrifying. It is
possible that the in-movers had
incomes and other characteristics
similar to the existing residents and
that the movers and nonmovers
alike were incrementally increasing
their incomes to create the noted
reduction in poverty. With gentrifi-
cation, in contrast, it would be
expected that those moving in are
mostly from a different race or class
than the original residents. 
Accordingly, we next looked at
data on changing racial/ethnic com-
position in these neighborhoods. For
simplicity, we divided the population
into four groups: Hispanics and three
racial groups (white, black, and
other), always defined to exclude
Hispanics of those races.6 Then, for
the one or more groups that increased
their population share over the
decade, we recorded the number of
percentage points by which they did
so. For example, if the Hispanic share
in a tract went up by 9 points, the
black share went up by 3 points, and
the share for the other groups
declined, our overall “race change
score” for the tract would be 12
points.
Interestingly, the data show very
few tracts whose racial/ethnic com-
positions changed dramatically over
the decade. Only one-quarter of all
tracts in the 100 largest metropolitan
areas experienced a shift of 15 per-
centage points or more by our mea-
sure. The median score was 7 points,
and the bottom quarter had scores of
3 points or less.
If any one race’s share of the
population in an improving poor
neighborhood went up by only 7 per-
cent over the decade (the median),
we doubt most observers would con-
sider this a major change in neigh-
borhood composition. To explore the
issue further, we decided to term
anything in the upper quartile of the
distribution (change of 15 points or
more) as “high race change” and
anything in the lowest quartile
(below 3 points) as “low race
change.” 
Results were quite different for
neighborhoods on different trajecto-
ries (figure 3). Worsening tracts were
much more likely to experience high
race change. Whereas only a quarter
of all tracts saw a race change of 15
points or more, just over half of all
worsening tracts did so. Overwhelm-
ingly in this group, the changes were
associated with people of color mov-
ing in: Hispanics accounted for the
largest share increases in 56 percent
of the worsening high–race change
tracts, and blacks were the leading
group in another 31 percent (figure 4).
While this was not true everywhere,
it appears that among neighborhoods
where poverty worsened notably in
the 1990s, the in-migration of lower-
income minorities was an important
influence.
The patterns differed for improv-
ing tracts. Change from one race or
ethnicity to another was not the dom-
inant factor. Only 22 percent of the
improving tracts—fewer than aver-
age—were in the high–race change
Low race change Moderate race change High race change
27%
51%
22%
Improving
(poverty rate decrease 5% or more)
10%
39%
51%
Worsening
(poverty rate increase 5% or more)
FIGURE 3. Extent of Racial Change for Improving and Worsening Census Tracts, 
100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1990–2000
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
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category, and a larger share (27 per-
cent) fell in the low–race change cate-
gory. For the latter, and for many in
the moderate–race change group, it
appears that the primary explanation
for the reduction in poverty must be
increases in income for the original
population (or people like them),
rather than higher-income house-
holds of a different race moving in to
replace them.
What about the 22 percent that
did experience high race change? The
composition is surprising. One might
have expected that most of these
cases would fit the gentrification
model, with many higher-income
whites moving in. In fact, Hispanics
accounted for the largest share
increases in 47 percent of all improv-
ing high–race change tracts, and
blacks were the leaders in another 
21 percent, leaving only 32 percent of
the cases accounted for primarily by
in-migration of whites and other
races (figure 4). 
Characteristics of High–Race
Change Neighborhoods
How do the characteristics of
high–race change neighborhoods dif-
fer across these categories? Table 3
looks first at differences in their loca-
tions by region. Most tracts where
Hispanics took the lead are found in
the West and South (mostly Texas
metropolitan areas), the West being
more dominant for worsening tracts
than improving tracts. Among tracts
where blacks were the growth lead-
ers, the Midwest accounted for by far
the largest share of improving tracts,
but the South, and secondarily the
Northeast and Midwest, were all
important among worsening tracts.
Improving tracts where whites and
other races grew fastest were split
fairly evenly across regions, but
worsening tracts in this category
were found mostly in the Northeast
and West.
No. of Improving Tracts with High Race No. of Worsening Tracts with High Race
Change by Most Rapidly Growing Group Change by Most Rapidly Growing Group
Total Hispanic Black White/other Total Hispanic Black White/other
By Region
Northeast 147 48 29 70 663 286 219 158
Midwest 261 82 101 78 342 111 209 22
South 287 159 58 70 803 371 395 37
West 241 150 9 82 1,003 799 46 158
Total 936 439 197 300 2,811 1,567 869 375
By Predominant Race in 1990
Hispanic 128 116 6 6 336 329 4 3
Black 124 40 59 25 316 31 277 8
White or other 216 45 34 137 521 227 158 136
No predominant race 468 238 98 132 1,638 980 430 228
Total 936 439 197 300 2,811 1,567 869 375
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
TABLE 3. Characteristics of High–Race Change Tracts
White or other Black Hispanic
Improving
(poverty rate decrease 5% or more)
32%
21%
47%
Worsening
(poverty rate increase 5% or more)
14%
31%
56%
FIGURE 4. Most Rapidly Growing Racial or Ethnic Group in High–Race Change, 
Improving and Worsening Census Tracts, 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1990–2000
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
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The table also presents data on
the racial/ethnic characteristics of
these tracts in 1990 (a predominant
race/ethnicity is defined as having
accounted for 60 percent or more of a
tract’s population in that year). The
first finding of interest is that tracts
with no predominant race at the start
of the decade account for a very high
share of the total in this high–race
change group: half the improving
tracts and three-fifths of the worsen-
ing ones. And these tracts account 
for around 50 to 60 percent regardless
of which race or ethnicity was the
fastest growing over the 1990s. This
suggests that, where major shifts in
the racial or ethnic composition of
neighborhoods occur, they most often
do so slowly—not typically even
within the span of a decade. 
The standout finding for the
remaining tracts (high race change in
the 1990s but with one predominant
race/ethnicity at the start) is that the
predominant group at the start was
most likely to be the fastest growing
over the decade. This was true for
around two-thirds of these cases,
among improving tracts as well as
worsening ones. An example would
be a neighborhood that was 61 per-
cent black in 1990 jumping to 76 per-
cent black by 2000. In other words,
these are neighborhoods that were
further polarizing racially. This does
not imply that such polarization was
a major trend in the 1990s. In fact,
research by Rawlings, Harris, and
Turner (2003) shows that the number
of racially diverse tracts increased in
metropolitan America in that decade;
their stability in that status was look-
ing up as well. The data presented
here simply say that some of the
opposite phenomenon (polarization)
is still going on.
Probably the most important
finding in this section, however, is
how little we found of what looks
like gentrification, at least as it is
most often defined. Witnessing the
poverty reductions in many urban
neighborhoods in the 1990s, many
observers seemed to assume that 
gentrification (with higher-income
whites displacing lower-income
minorities) was behind most of them.
Even though our measures are crude,
our findings sharply contradict that
assumption. Only 300 tracts (7 per-
cent of all 4,278 tracts that improved
in the 100 largest metropolitan areas
in the 1990s) were high–race change
tracts where whites (or other 
non-Hispanic, nonblack groups)
accounted for the largest increases. To
be sure, these do not account for all
gentrifying tracts. For example, there
are no doubt others where whites
started moving in and replacing
minorities near the end of the 1990s
that did not meet our 15 percent
change threshold for the high–race
change category for the decade as a
whole (census data do not let us iso-
late these). Nonetheless, the number
that does meet our criteria is surpris-
ingly small.
What Kinds of 
Neighborhoods Improved 
or Worsened?
Public officials and others interested
in neighborhood well-being would
obviously benefit from knowing
ahead of time the characteristics that
differentiate neighborhoods likely to
decline, remain stable, or improve.
Unfortunately, our analysis does not
offer very satisfying guidance in this
regard. However, some of the charac-
teristics we examined are noteworthy.
One of them is location. We
divided the tracts in each metropoli-
tan area into seven geographical divi-
sions (following the approach
developed by Berube and Forman
2002). The first includes all central-
city tracts with centroids located
within 1 mile of the centroid of the
central business district (CBD). We
then established three other rings
within in the central city, dividing all
remaining central-city tracts into ter-
ciles based on the distance between
their centroids and that of the CBD.
Finally, we defined three suburban
rings in a similar manner (dividing
all suburban tracts into terciles based
on the distance between their cen-
troids and that of the central-city
CBD).
The results are shown in figure 5.
It is important to note first that some
tracts of all types as we have defined
them are found in each location; that
is, there is considerable mix for all
groups. Nonetheless, differences in
patterns are distinct. Tracts that
improved were overwhelmingly
located at the inner and outer ex-
tremes of the metropolis. More 
than half of those in the central city
were located in the CBD or ring 1 
(57 percent for high–race change
tracts and 50 percent for low–race
change tracts). Improving suburban
tracts were predominantly located in
ring 3 (41 percent for high–race
change tracts and 59 percent for
low–race change tracts).
In contrast, worsening tracts were
most often located in the middle: ring
3 in the cities and ring 1 in the sub-
urbs. This was consistently true in the
suburbs where ring 1 accounted for
the largest shares of those that wors-
ened; 44 percent for high–race change
tracts and 40 percent for low–race
change tracts. It was also true for
high–race change tracts in the cities
where 39 percent were in ring 3;
although for low–race change tracts,
the largest share (39 percent) was
found in ring 2.
What other initial characteristics
might differentiate improving from
worsening neighborhoods? Since 
we know that important differences
in conditions are associated with
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poverty levels, we next divided all tracts
into two groups—poverty rates under 
20 percent and poverty rates of 20 percent
or more—and then compared characteris-
tics of improving and worsening tracts
within these groups. We looked at 1990
values of a number of traditional indica-
tors of well-being (e.g., education levels,
public assistance rates), as well as house-
hold composition and housing tenure. 
We also looked at 1990–2000 population
growth (or decline) and the percent of the
tracts’ 2000 population that had moved
over the preceding five years. Values of
many of these indicators were indeed 
different for lower- versus higher-poverty
categories, but we found almost no notable
differences between improving and 
worsening tracts on average within those
categories. 
We next constructed a multivariate
model to test the independent effects of the
above factors on the change in poverty rate
from 1990 to 2000. The independent vari-
ables included measures of the metropoli-
tan economy, tract location, initial tract
poverty rate, racial composition, racial
change, and six social conditions (table 4).
Our results generally validated the bivari-
ate relationships noted earlier, but together
the predictors only explained about a third
of the variation in neighborhood poverty
change in the 1990s. 
Consistent with the 2003 analysis of
poverty rate trends in the 1980s by Galster
and colleagues, neighborhood trajectories
over the 1990s were linked to economic and
housing conditions in the surrounding met-
ropolitan area. Every percentage point
increase in the metropolitan poverty rate
over the 1990s corresponded to a 0.33 per-
centage point increase in the tract poverty
rate. In addition, a strong or intermediate
housing market correlated with about a 
High
race
change
Improving
Central Cities
Worsening Improving Worsening
Suburbs
Low
race
change
High
race
change
Low
race
change
High
race
change
Low
race
change
High
race
change
Low
race
change
CBD + Ring 1 Ring 2 Ring 3
39
25
59
22
35
26
37
30
39
24
23
34
25
30
36 35
18
44
40
41
1417
50
57
FIGURE 5. Location of Improving and Worsening Census Tracts, 100 Largest Metropolitan
Areas, 1980s and 1990s
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
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All tracts Poor tracts
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.29
Number of observations 37,630 3,996
Coefficients
Intercept –3.40** 0.03
Metropolitan Area
Economic/Population Trends, 1990–2000
Change in metropolitan poverty rate 0.33** 0.26*
Percent change in metropolitan population 0.00 0.06**
Housing Market (omitted variable: weak market)
Strong metropolitan housing market –0.55** –3.43**
Intermediate metropolitan housing market –0.48** –3.42**
Census Tract
Location
In central city: distance in miles from 0.04** –0.01
central business district
In suburbs: distance in miles from –0.02** –0.03
central business district
Poverty Rate, 1990
Poverty rate –0.42** –0.66**
Poverty rate squared 0.00** 0.00
Racial Composition, 1990 (omitted variable: majority white tracts)
Greater than 60% black 1.35** 0.81
Greater than 60% Hispanic –0.30 –1.97*
Greater than 60% other minority race 1.01** 0.31
No dominant race 0.40** –0.60
Racial Change, 1990–2000 (omitted variable: low racial change)
High racial change: shift to Hispanic 2.97** –0.10
High racial change: shift to black 3.25** 2.53**
High racial change: shift to white/other –0.29* –6.96**
Moderate racial change: Hispanic 0.77** 1.57**
Moderate racial change: black 1.03** 2.12**
Moderate racial change: white/other –0.06 –2.12**
Social Conditions, 1990
Percent of population age 16+ not working 0.20** 0.76**
Percent renter-occupied 0.04** –0.01
Percent foreign-born –0.05** –0.07*
Percent of population >age 25 without high school degree 0.01* –0.06
Rental vacancy rate 0.02** –0.07
Percent of families that are female-headed 0.03** –0.08*
Sq. of percent of population age 16+ not working –0.0010** –0.01**
Sq. of percent renter-occupied 0.0004** 0.001**
Sq. of percent foreign-born 0.0009** 0.001
Sq. of percent of population >age 25 
without high school degree 0.0009** 0.001
Sq. of rental vacancy rate –0.0004* 0.002
Sq. of percent of families that are female-headed 0.0001 0.000
Source: Urban Institute analysis of data from the Neighborhood Change Database.
* = significant at .05 level.
** = significant at .01 level.
TABLE 4. Regressions on Change in Poverty Rates, 1990–2000
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0.5 point reduction in poverty compared to
weak markets. With these two economic
measures in the model, the change in met-
ropolitan population was not significantly
related to changes in poverty rates.
The model verified that neighborhood
location matters. For central-city tracts,
being farther away from the CBD was posi-
tively correlated with rising poverty rates.
The suburban tracts exhibited the opposite
relationship, with locations in the inner
suburbs more likely to face increasing
poverty. Also consistent with tabular pre-
sentations earlier in this brief, higher initial
poverty levels were associated with a
decrease in poverty rates. 
Race and racial change were both
strong predictors of poverty rate trends.
Neighborhoods with greater than 60 per-
cent non-Hispanic black or other non-
Hispanic minority populations in 1990 were
more likely to experience rising poverty
rates than predominantly white tracts. This
pattern also held for those areas with no
dominant race, though to a lesser extent.
Having moderate or high levels of racial
change with growing shares of blacks or
Hispanics was associated with worsening
poverty compared to neighborhoods with
little racial change (defined for this purpose
as 0.8 to 3.3 points). Major racial shifts in
the white or other minority population
share related to improvement in poverty
rates, but the associated decreases reached
only about one-tenth of the absolute mag-
nitude of the poverty rate increases seen
with the minority shifts.
Even taking all the above factors into
account, all six social conditions in the
model were significantly correlated to
poverty changes. The percent of population
age 16 and older that was not working
overwhelmed the others in influence, but
even that relationship was fairly weak—
only a 0.20-point increase in poverty for
every 1-point increase in the nonemploy-
ment rate. Of the six indicators, only the
percent foreign-born showed an inverse
relationship, with higher proportion of
immigrants associated with falling poverty
rates. This supports other research showing
that poverty rates for immigrants
decreased more quickly than for native-
born individuals in the 1990s (Chapman
and Bernstein 2003). The significance of all
but one of the squared indicators, even
with very small coefficients, demonstrates
the continuing need to explore key thresh-
old levels for different neighborhood 
characteristics. 
We also performed the regression
analysis separately for census tracts with
poverty rates of 30 percent or higher. The
findings revealed that the factors related to
changes in poverty rates for these dis-
tressed areas differed in important ways
from those for all tracts.7 First, poverty
trends in poor tracts were more strongly
tied to the health of the metropolitan hous-
ing market, with the coefficients for the
strong and intermediate status six times
higher than for all tracts. 
Second, the connections between racial
characteristics and changing poverty rates
in poor tracts diverged in significance and
strength from the patterns for all tracts. In a
very different pattern than for all neighbor-
hoods, majority-Hispanic tracts were the
only racial category proved significantly
correlated in the model restricted to high-
poverty tracts. Hispanic tracts were linked
to a 2-point improvement in the poverty
rate compared with mostly white ones. Ear-
lier we noted that most high-poverty tracts
that improved in the 1990s did not see
major jumps in the share of white popula-
tion, but where the racial shifts did occur,
this model shows they were accompanied
by major shifts in poverty rates. For poor
neighborhoods, a large shift toward a white
or other non-Hispanic, nonblack minority
population was accompanied by a 7-point
fall in poverty rate—the highest coefficient
in both models. Unlike the general model,
the moderate increases in the share of
whites also came up significant for poor
tracts. 
Implications
After decades of bleak news for American
cities, the 1990s saw some notable improve-
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ments, particularly a reduction in the con-
centration of poverty. If people have come
to believe a continuation of this overall
trend is inevitable, however, this brief
should shake them out of their compla-
cency. Indeed, there were net improve-
ments, and they may well continue, but
countervailing forces were also operating
as poverty rates increased in significant
numbers of other metropolitan neighbor-
hoods. In terms of the overall pattern of
change, the 1990s looked like the 1980s,
with large numbers of neighborhoods both
improving and worsening in each decade.
It is just that in the 1990s, the balance
shifted in a more positive direction.
Conditions in regional economies and
housing markets are clearly important to
these outcomes. Where markets are strong,
the share of neighborhoods that improve
will be higher than where markets are
weak. However, the results are always a
mix; some neighborhoods worsen even in
the strongest markets and vice versa. Our
regression analysis explained only about a
third of the variation across metropolitan
areas. Clearly, there should be room for
local policy to make a difference. 
Beyond efforts to bolster local
economies and housing markets, what
should local officials try to do? This
research makes it very clear that few areas
in cities are truly static. Changes in neigh-
borhood fortunes in both directions are
almost sure to occur, and officials need to
be alert for them, anticipate them, and take
preparatory actions when and where they
can.
This analysis is unable to offer many
clues as to what changes to expect where.
But with vast improvements in local data
sets and GIS capacities, there is a potential
to develop local “early warning” and moni-
toring systems that should be able to pro-
vide substantially better guidance than has
been possible up to now (Chandler et al.
2006). Officials should watch for abrupt
changes in a number of indicators—for
example, property sales volumes, median
sales prices, foreclosure rates, tax arrears,
rates of food stamp receipt, and share of
students eligible for free and reduced-price
lunches. These indicators are being
updated at a neighborhood level, and made
accessible in an automated form, in a grow-
ing number of cities. 
If local stakeholders have more reliable
advanced warning, what should they do
with it? Given the threat of displacement,
neighborhoods that are gentrifying should
probably warrant the highest priority for
attention. Our analysis showed that most
improving neighborhoods in the 1990s
were not experiencing marked racial
change, but the number that were doing
so was still significant, and displacement
is a risk in others where higher-income
groups of the same race as current resi-
dents are moving in. Typically, where gen-
trification is under way, the goal should
not be to stop the process—neighborhoods
in this category have needed an injection
of new investment for many years. Rather,
the objective should be to moderate and
guide it so significant numbers of resi-
dents can be retained and also benefit
from the improvements; that is, so the
result will be a sustainable mixed-income
community. 
This scenario might have seemed naïve
a decade ago, and it still is unlikely to work
where gentrification is already advanced.
However, where certain techniques are ini-
tiated early enough, they appear promising
at this point (see the options described in
Levy, Comey, and Padilla 2006 and at
http://policylink.org/EDTK). These
include inclusionary zoning along with the
facilitation of ownership change and other
property-by-property interventions that
preserve units at affordable prices. Of
course, some new subsidies will be needed
as well, but techniques like these help to
moderate the amounts of subsidy
required—enough so local governments in
a number of cities now appear willing to
devote substantial amounts of their own
revenues toward these ends.
What about neighborhoods that are
worsening? Most important at the outset is
to ensure that local public policies are not
exacerbating the problem by reconcentrat-
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ing the poor—for example, by locating too
many voucher recipients or subsidized
units in any neighborhood. Even if that is
not happening, however, the evidence pre-
sented earlier shows that sizeable numbers
of low-income families are moving into
some new types of neighborhoods on their
own. What should be done in these cases?
Actually, the underlying objectives
should be similar to those for gentrifica-
tion. Stakeholders should not want to stop
the process; that is, they do not want to
prevent lower-income families (from the
inner cities and elsewhere) from moving
into better neighborhoods. But again,
stakeholders probably want to find ways 
to guide the process so many current res-
idents (in this case from higher-income
families) will remain and a sustainable,
mixed-income community will result.
Early actions in this case should
emphasize ensuring that more lower-
income residents moving in does not trans-
late into a deterioration in neighborhood
conditions. This may entail extra efforts to
keep the streets clean, enforce codes to sus-
tain property maintenance, community
policing to keep the crime rate low, and ser-
vices for the new entrants to help them
adapt to and sustain themselves success-
fully in their new environments. Many of
these techniques have been tested in the
“healthy neighborhoods approach”
(Boehlke 2001).
America has now learned a great deal
about the tragic consequences of concen-
trated poverty and how past trends in that
direction were exacerbated by a range of
public policies. The research presented in
this brief demonstrates that poverty con-
centration is certainly not inevitable. Alter-
native policies and programs do exist that
can help push the trends away from polar-
ization and hopefully create many more of
what Katz (2004) has called “neighbor-
hoods of choice and connection.”
Notes
1. The NCDB was developed by the Urban Institute
and GeoLytics, Inc. Documentation can be found at
http://www.geolytics.com. To avoid outliers, the
database for this analysis excludes 286 tracts with
less than 200 population in 1980, 1990, and 2000. It
also excludes 679 metropolitan tracts as defined in
2000 that were in areas that were not tracted in 1980
(i.e., for which no 1980 tract-level data exist). Since
census tract boundaries do not always conform to
municipal boundaries, we define each city as the
aggregation of 2000 census tracts that most closely
approximates the official place boundary, and use
those same boundaries for 1980 and 1990. Thus our
city population totals may differ from the place
totals published by the Bureau of the Census. 
2. Actually, there were 331 metropolitan areas in 2000,
but we exclude Barnstable-Yarmouth because cen-
sus tracts were not defined within it in 1980. We
selected the largest 100 Primary Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas (PMSAs) and Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) based on their 1990 populations. We
exclude suburban PMSAs that did not have large
central cities within their own boundaries. The
Bureau of the Census recognizes several individual
municipalities as “central cities” in many metropol-
itan areas. For this analysis, we generally accept
only the predominant city as the central city (e.g.,
Chicago in the Chicago PMSA). In seven cases,
however, we classified two municipalities as
together making up the central city:
Anaheim/Santa Ana, CA; Fort Lauderdale/Holly-
wood, FL; Greensboro/Winston Salem, NC;
Greenville/Spartanburg, SC; Minneapolis/St. Paul,
MN; Tampa/St. Petersburg, FL; and West Palm
Beach/Boca Raton, FL. 
3. With the categories above, tracts with poverty rates
near the boundary lines between categories can
move from one to another if their rates change by
only 1 or 2 percentage points, so this approach
could distort perceptions depending how observa-
tions are bunched near the boundaries. 
4. These two measures are highly, but not perfectly,
correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.76).
5. The Z-score expresses the value for a particular
variable in terms of the number of standard devia-
tions from the mean it represents for that variable.
By scaling all values by the mean and standard
deviation, the Z-score generates a measure that
always has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
1, thereby eliminating scale effects. 
6. To allocate non-Hispanics who identified more than
one race in the 2000 Census into the three racial cat-
egories, we applied an algorithm developed by
demographer Jeffrey Passel that we believe
achieves reasonable comparability over time (see
explanation in Tatian 2003). 
7. There were several other notable differences
between the two models. The metropolitan change
in population became significant but in a counterin-
tuitive direction, with increases in population asso-
ciated with increases in poverty. And location in
relation to the CBD did not persist as a significant
predictor for poor tracts, likely because most poor
tracts in 1990 were clustered in the center city. 
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